gent approach to teaching. Even apparently "conservative" forms of pedagogy can be productive and useful under certain circumstances. Some subject matters truly are taught best and more efficiently through direct modes of instruction. Lectures can be vivid, engaging, and participatory in spirit (they need not be authoritarian or based on a static view of knowledge, as the "banking method" characterization Freire gave them would suggest). Perhaps even more important, dialogical methods can be hectoring, manipulative, and tacitly authoritarian, even given the best of intentions. There is nothing in the method that guarantees liberatory outcomes.
Beyond this, the whole Freirean tradition of critical pedagogy, with its emphasis on dialogue, has come under severe criticism from feminist, poststructural, and postcolonial perspectives. Perhaps the most important of these criticisms has come from Elizabeth Ellsworth (1989 Ellsworth ( , 1997 , beginning with her often-cited essay "Why Doesn't This Feel Empowering? Working Through the Repressive Myths of Critical Pedagogy" and then elaborated more fully in her book Teaching Positions. Some of these criticisms were also picked up and developed by Mary Leach (1992) and Patti Lather (1998) . The central issue raised by this work can be described as interrogating the unconscious of dialogue. As in other kinds of analytic examination, the aim is to look beneath the surface of overt meanings and expressed intentions to examine what is not being acknowledged or talked about.
The danger of dialogue, which represents itself as an open conversation in which anyone can speak and any topic can be broached, is not only that certain people may not be speaking, certain things may not be spoken (or may not even be speakable in the terms tacitly valorized by the dialogue), but that precisely because the surface level of the engagement is so apparently reasonable, inclusive, and well intentioned, what gets left out, or who gets left out, remains not only hidden but is subtly denigrated. If you cannot (or will not) express yourself in this manner, the fault lies with you. Yet, as in other sorts of communicative struggle, if one is forced to express one's objections in a vocabulary or manner that are not of one's choosing, the effect may be either to suppress some of those objections or to force them through a semantic filter that changes their meaning and impact. What is needed, Ellsworth (1997) argues, is an analytical interrogation that disrupts the comfortable surface of what is taken for granted, that refuses to accept at face value the rationales and conventions that others have become comfortable with: "What gets 'analyzed' . . . is the route of a reading. How did you arrive at this interpretation, without knowing it-maybe even without desiring it" (p. 125)? In pointing out what is not open about dialogue, Ellsworth and other critics also draw from a wider body of literature that wants to look at the reserve side of ostensibly "inclusive" educational practices, such as dialogue, to examine what is, in practice, exclusive about them.
Another line of criticism can be drawn from the work of Iris Young (2001) , who distinguishes deliberative and activist modes of communication.
Although not speaking directly about dialogue in pedagogical contexts, her cri-tique illuminates another important dimension of the issue. Deliberative communication is oriented toward reasonable engagement, negotiation, compromise, and a fair exploration of all sides of an issue. Activist communication is about making a point that needs to be made, even if it is rude, disruptive, and impolite. The protestor shouts an insult at a government official in a passing car, an orator screams about an injustice that is going unnoticed, a participant in an argument suddenly bursts out with a grievance that seems to have nothing to do with the topic at hand, and so on. Such activist (and nondialogical) modes of speech are in many cases intended to disrupt, they are meant to shock more than to persuade, they are concerned with expressing a view or a feeling that may have been long suppressed, for the sake of the person speaking, or for third parties who might hear it, more than for the sake of those who might be offended or upset by it, or who may not even be able to hear or understand what is being said. The goal is not to persuade but to challenge, to confront the other. To insist that such activist utterances must be converted into the careful, balanced language and reasonable tone of a deliberative engagement is to miss what is important about such utterances as speech acts; it is to defuse them of part of their purpose and impact. In pedagogical dialogue, the reasonable and deliberative mode is for obvious and mostly legitimate reasons privileged; the activist mode is not oriented toward the aspirations of understanding and consensus that dialogue generally pursues. But this means, as a consequence, that if some things cannot be said in a moderate, calm, and polite way, they do not get said at all; and even in pedagogical settings, these sorts of activist challenges, between student and teacher or between students, have a place and a potential educational value. Furthermore, restrictions on activist speech weigh disproportionately on participants from groups who may be more comfortable with expressive, confrontational forms of speech or those whose experiences or concerns cannot be framed in the calmly deliberative mode.
Alison Jones (1999 Jones ( , 2004 highlights a related problem of dialogue in contexts of cultural difference. The desire for dialogue, as she puts it, can carry its own kinds of coercive influence. When people from different backgrounds try to discuss their experiences and differences-as often happens in multicultural classrooms-they are put in asymmetrical positions of risk and self-disclosure. Who are these conversations for, and who do they benefit? When multicultural educators talk about the virtues of cross-cultural understanding, this is tilted almost always in the direction of the supposed benefits of dominant groups coming to better understand members of nondominant groups. Jones challenges this aspiration. For one thing, because groups are nondominant, they often have to expend much more time and effort explaining themselves to the dominant groups than vice versa; indeed, nondominant groups may already understand a great deal about the dominant culture (more than they want to, sometimes). The benefits of assuaging liberal guilt or reassuring members of dominant groups of their open-mindedness and good intent are reinforced by such conversations-benefits not necessarily available to the members of nondominant groups themselves. There can even be a kind of voyeurism: "Dialogue and recognition of difference turn out to be access for dominant groups to the thoughts, cultures, lives of others" (p. 65). For Jones, the desire for the embodied other . . . may also be a desire for redemption, or forgiveness, on behalf of the white students. . . . [T] he dominant group seeks its own inclusion by being rescued from its inability to hear the voices of the marginalized. (pp. 64-65) In such cases, Jones says, members of nondominant groups may hold back from participating in the conversation, remaining silent as a strategy of selfprotection, or even seeking to withdraw from the common classroom space entirely.
Megan Boler (2004) , along with Jones and other contributors to Boler's excellent collection, Democratic Dialogue in Education: Troubling Speech, Disturbing Silence, examines some pedagogical responses to such dangers in dialogue. Two of these issues are especially pertinent to my concerns here. One is the creation of separate spaces in the classroom, where members of particular groups can speak safely with others who share common experiences and backgrounds, where they do not have to explain themselves to others or reeducate them at the cost of their own effort and trouble. The other concerns strategies of requiring some participants to refrain from speaking in a discussion to create a space for others, who may have been silent, to feel encouraged to speak. (In some cases, this may be joined to the intention to make dominant group members "see what it feels like" to be in a silenced position.) Both of these approaches can be viewed as a constraint on fully open dialogue in which participants ought to be able to participate in any way and to any extent that they choose, but these also can be viewed as provisional compromises made to encourage more and better dialogue, albeit dialogue of a different sort than the fully open, participatory ideal. It is the inability of that idealized mode of dialogue to accommodate the involvement of diverse others that has made some progressive teachers adopt strategies that identify different rules of engagement for different participants. Boler terms this affirmative action pedagogy, and (as with affirmative action policies more generally) one key question here is whether these accommodations are seen as a necessary evil, are a compensatory stage to be gradually put aside as groups gain in confidence and trust in each other in the hopes of eventually having a wider and more inclusive conversation, or become a more or less permanent state, setting aside the ideal of open participatory dialogue altogether.
This issue can be viewed in another way. An underlying ethos of theories of dialogue is that although problems certainly can crop up during an exchange (misunderstanding, conflict, hard feelings, disagreement about the purpose of the discussion, etc.), these can and should be redeemed within the framework of dialogue itself (Habermas's, 1981 , work is a prime example of this ethos).
The solution to problems encountered in dialogue should be pursued through more dialogue (Burbules & Rice, 1991) . Jones (2004) , in her essay in Boler's book, and Suzanne de Castell (2004) , in her contribution, both term this approach the Talking Cure, as if all problems should be talked through until a solution presents itself. Yet such a valorization of dialogue, and its conception as a particular kind of communicative interchange, expresses a number of culturally bounded assumptions about how people ought to communicate and express themselves. Instead, Jones and others want to examine when silence and withdrawal from dialogue may be the more appropriate response.
Huey-li Li (2004) , in another chapter of Boler's book, explores the issue of silence in a very different way (see also Caranfa, 2004; Zembylas & Michaelides, 2004) . Many critics regard the issue of silence either through the lens of asymmetrical power (groups or individuals are "silenced") or as a pointed refusal to participate, an active or passive withdrawal from participation. Li wants to argue instead for the expressive possibilities of silence: Silence is not the opposite of speech; rather, they form a "continuum." There are different kinds of silence, she points out, and those truly interested in cross-cultural understanding need to take on the burden themselves of hearing what these different kinds of silence might mean. Forcing others to speak, to articulate what they think and feel in explicit words, is in Li's phrase "silencing silence," and she means this as a rebuke to well-intended teachers who believe they are serving the interests of those groups by "privileging their voices" or continually pressing them to speak up and "contribute." For Li, the socially committed classroom is often too chatty, too preoccupied with verbal dialogue to listen to its silences. In the rush to fill empty discursive spaces with more talk, real if subtle connotations are missed, and cultures that privilege silence (she mentions Navaho, Zen, and Indian yoga as examples) are effectively "silenced" themselves by an ethos that says, "for you to be heard, you must speak in our way." Li (2004) describes different kinds of silences and places the responsibility squarely on dominant groups to spend more time cultivating in themselves the capacity for listening (including listening to silences) and less on trying to "give voice" to those who may not want it. Silence can be of many sorts, and if one takes silence as an indication of a problem, something to be remedied or compensated for, this depends greatly on what type of silence one takes it to be. For example, silence can be voluntary and self-imposed, or it can be the result of external pressures and constraints; silence can be expressive, or it can be empty, unreadable; silence can be temporary, situational, or it can represent a consistent, problematic pattern; silence can signify active withdrawal from a conversation, or it can be an indicator of attentive, thoughtful listening. As Li makes clear, assaying silence and deciding whether it is educationally pernicious or beneficial requires attention to numerous cultural and situational specifics and cannot be diagnosed with broad, dichotomous categories (either one "has voice" or one "is silenced"). A significant question here, then, is How can a teacher know what kind of silence she or he is dealing with? Whose silence is a cause for concern and why? But Li's central point is that our tendency to denigrate silence or to see it automatically as a sign of some deeper problem overly valorizes the chatty dimensions of participation, and in this sense, it poses a substantial challenge to the ways we think about dialogue.
The Politics of Dialogue
Standing back from these particular criticisms, what has shifted in the educational literature is a move away from an idealized conception of dialogue to a cultural politics of dialogue: Dialogue is neither a good nor a bad thing, in itself, and the decision about whether to teach with dialogue, when, and with whom-or, on the other side, the decision to participate in it, or not (whether, when, and with whom)-needs to be made within a broader political analysis of identity, interest, and purpose. We think of the educational context as a generally altruistic one, given to the promotion of freedom, the open expression and exploration of ideas, and personal as well as group or community development and advancement, for all participants. In progressive classrooms, these values are embedded in a larger vision of social liberation and teaching as an expression of political commitment; here, it can be particularly difficult-and threatening-to explore the possibility that one's own teaching and good intentions can be part of the problem. Elizabeth Ellsworth (1997) , most of the authors in Megan Boler's (2004) collection, and Ira Shor (1996) all offer examples of this relentless self-criticism.
But when these questions get resituated in a recognition of diverse styles of communication, diverse identities, and most of all diverse political interests and purposes, good intentions derived from even the most liberatory sentiments no longer suffice. Suddenly dialogue-if any of the aforementioned criticisms carry weight-reappears as a potentially quite restrictive, possibly even hegemonic norm and constraint. The educational purposes of promoting mutual understanding, tolerance, and empathy, although clearly of value, may not be the overriding values in all circumstances. The interests of all students may not be servable all at the same time. One's own implication as a teacher, with one's own identity, interests, and purposes, may come into question as well.
A totally politicized classroom, however, is equally a problem. 1 If there is any value to institutionalized classes, programs, subject matters, degrees, and so on, it must partly reside in the value of content, literatures, perspectives, and cognitive skills and dispositions that one believes students (all students) ought to encounter, even if critically. If there is any value to the authorized role of a teacher, it is that not all knowledge and expertise is equal and that some experience and qualifications justify a unique-though not unassailable-status for the pedagogue, even in an egalitarian classroom. None of this should be beyond question or challenge, but if it is perpetually up for question or challenge, nothing else will get accomplished. Turning every class, every discussion, into an object lesson for making some wider political point is a form of activism that, to my way of thinking, eventually comes into conflict with other educational values; and given liberatory purposes, the last people who are served by compromising those wider educational purposes are those from nondominant groups who cannot take for granted the knowledge and habitus that advantage the members of dominant groups in educational and professional settings (particularly settings that have less tolerance for political contestation than university classrooms do).
And so this way of reframing the question regards the development of dialogical relations as itself a political project, one in which there may be good reasons to resist or challenge even the terms and conditions of dialogue itself. But at the same time, politics is always for something, and it is difficult to imagine any conception of social justice that does not at some level seek dialogue and more open, responsive communicative relations as an end point. Hence, even challenges to dialogue must entail, at some level, a commitment to dialogue itself. The further question, then, is dialogues of what kind?
Dialogue and Third Spaces
In my earlier work, I distinguished at least four types of dialogue: inquiry, instruction, conversation, and debate (Burbules, 1993) . Although each is broadly dialogical in nature, these constitute very different kinds of communicative engagement-some more critical, others more engaging and inclusive; some more convergent (headed toward a "correct" or consensual answer), others more divergent (in which the profusion of ideas and perspectives is itself a value). Other forms, including, for example, what Ellsworth (1997) calls "analytic dialogue," could be added to the list. The key point here is that these are different forms of dialogue, operating by different norms, given to quite different purposes, and possibly suited to very different sorts of people, situations, and subject matters. Hence, it is important to recognize that sometimes resistance or challenge to dialogue is actually resistance or challenge to a particular type of dialogue (e.g., an aggressive debate), for the sake of pursuing another type of dialogue (e.g., a more inclusive and nonjudgmental conversation)-or vice versa-but not to the value of dialogue itself. I believe that this confusion, and tendency to homogenize all forms of dialogue under the same umbrella, has led to some wasted arguments (Burbules, 2000) . But here, I would like to explore another dimension of dialogue (though it is not exactly a "type" of dialogue), which I hope will complicate and enrich this discussion even further.
One of the legacies of postmodern, and especially postcolonial literatures, has been a growing interest in "border zones," "contact zones," and "liminal" spaces (Pratt, 1987 (Pratt, , 1999 )-the area of the "in-between," spanning yet being exactly part of neither space. In a different way, this is expressed as an interest in "hybrids," "creoles," "pidgins," and "mestizas." In Homi Bhabha's (1994) Burbules • Rethinking Dialogue 113 work, and elsewhere, this theoretical notion is described as a "third space" (Soja, 1996) . Kris Gutierrez, Rymes, and Larson (1995) give a memorable example of a third space in an account of a classroom discussion of Brown v. Board of Education-at least, that is what the teacher thought was being discussed. At the same time, however, the students were interpreting her references to Brown as referring to James Brown, the soul singer. So statements such as "Brown was very important to raising the consciousness of Black Americans" were being systematically translated into a radically different frame of reference and in this sense were "misunderstood." But let's focus on that last word: a better term might be understood differently. A third space, communicatively speaking, is a zone in which semantic frames meet, conflict, and get attached with meanings neither original party intended or could have intended. One way to view this is simply as a mistake. Yet this kind of "mistake" can lead to an enhancement of understanding: for example, in the classroom described, a reflection on whether a traditional view of history as based on legal decisions and democratic polities has more to do with the shaping of human freedom, racial/ethnic identity, and self-respect than might a view based more on popular culture. Now this account of third spaces might be confused with ideas, such as that of Hans-Georg Gadamer (1976) , pursuing what he calls "a fusion of horizons." But this misses what is distinctive about third-space thinking. The key idea here is not about bridge building, fusing, blending, or reconciling; it is about a conflict, a disruption of ordinary meanings that leads to a new possibility. Call it a "creative misunderstanding," if you will. A third space, therefore, is not a "middle ground" or "merging" or "compromise" between the original views but a reframing of the topic-one that may indeed implicitly challenge the way in which the topic is originally being framed.
Furthermore, a third space is not necessarily a solution to the problem of disagreement or misunderstanding. Some appropriations of the term want to domesticate the notion, turn it into another way in which "bad" conflicts can be made to go away, or work out nicely. But I would insist that third spaces are problematic and problematizing moments, risky and as prone to chaos, or even heightened conflict, as to producing new understandings.
Viewing third space as a mutually established, shared discursive zone also reveals its provisional character, bounded in circumstance, space, and time. Sometimes, discursive third spaces are linked to actual border zones-a room, a street, a table, an open plain, where contending parties meet-and sometimes also are linked to specific practices, even rituals, that establish an unusual place and time. This situational character shows again why third spaces are provisional, bounded in circumstance, and so typically not the sorts of things that can be normalized, transferred, or exported to other places and times. If the teacher in Gutierrez's example had tried to recreate the same serendipitous misunderstanding with another classroom, or if I had tried to imitate it in my classroom, it is very unlikely that the same kind of third space would have resulted. Most important, third spaces, although requiring the participation of multiple actors from different discursive frames (and in this sense having a consensual character), do not necessarily yield anything that can be called in a simple way consent, agreement, or understanding. Conflicts that preceded the encounter may still exist, perhaps even with a heightened and more vivid impact. Third spaces do not necessarily make conflicts go away; that is not their primary purpose and value. They become a potential framework in which to recognize and discuss those conflicts with fresh terms and perspectives and, in that, possibly to understand them better. Sometimes that is all we can hope to achieve.
This final point shows how the pursuit and openness to third spaces is itself a political project: It requires a willingness to do so. It requires a tolerance for a certain kind of friction, risk, and uncertainty. It requires a judgment about who is worth pursuing such understandings with and who is not. To the extent that it may yield a kind of mutual understanding and respect, with which partners does one desire such a relation? As I noted earlier, an abiding problem of many traditional views of dialogue, including some of my own earlier work, is the lingering idea that dialogue can, given persistence, reconcile all disagreements and misunderstandings. Even if that were possible-and there are good reasons today for doubting whether it is possible-there still remains a significant question about whether it is desirable. For certain views, especially certain varieties of liberalism, it is an unquestioned assumption that, of course, it is desirable (if it is possible). Although I cannot explore the idea fully here, I ask you to consider the many contexts today in which it is far from clear whether contending groups truly do desire the reconciliation and harmony of their different worldviews, values, and interests-and, from their standpoint at least, whether they ought to desire that. Third-space thinking provides a different and challenging way of thinking about the communicative politics of such engagements.
Third Spaces Today
The concerns discussed here are especially salient to educational and other contexts today, when the conditions of globalization and what Arjun Appadurai (1996) calls "flows" are bringing people, ideas, and value systems into more and more intimate and frequent contact (and conflict) around the world (Burbules, 2000) . What are the communicative skills and dispositions that will prepare young people for growing up in a globalized world? How should wider social, cultural, and political differences be addressed? Is there an alternative to violent assaults in responding to deep, fundamental disagreements, rivalries, and grievances? As I have stressed, dialogue, including dialogues in those zones called third spaces, offers no solutions to such situations of potential conflict and misunderstanding; at most, it provides a different framework for thinking about what communicative engagement in such situa- Burbules • Rethinking Dialogue 115 tions ought to be aiming for. Needless to say, there are no guarantees of success, even given good intentions, and there certainly are no guarantees of good intentions. Finally, I want to touch briefly on one of the changes that has brought these globalized differences into even closer proximity with each other, and that is the Internet. The Internet is both a strongly globalized as well as a powerfully globalizing influence. This is itself a huge topic, but a key feature of the Internet is its own functioning as a kind of third space, a contact zone that fosters communication (and conflict) among extended virtual communities who would never have engaged one another before (Burbules, 2003) . Here, too, young people today are growing up with a need for communicative skills and dispositions that will allow them to participate in this increasingly important educational and professional space-for all its dangers and risks. And yet educational progressives and critical theorists have been almost entirely silent on the topic of new information and communication technologies, except to criticize them (as promoting technocratic teaching, as venues for corporatism and increased commercialism in schools, and so on). Although I think that many of these criticisms and concerns have merit, the challenge today is to think about these resources in terms of their possibilities as well as their dangersindeed, the inseparability of their possibilities and their dangers-and to understand that new information and communication technologies have become an indispensable part of living, learning, and working in developed societies (Burbules & Callister, 2000) . As one piece of such an analysis, I would like to revisit the theme of dialogue, and some of the critical issues discussed in this article, in the context of online communication and interaction: What are the possibilities (and the dangers) of online dialogue today, especially in the context of global networks?
Dialogue in Networked Spaces
Because, as noted, the online space is also a globalized and globalizing space, critical perspectives such as those of Freire, which highlight the imbalances of communicative access and authority, remain as pertinent as ever. Elsewhere, Callister and I have written about the emerging "global caste society," by which I do not mean simply a "digital divide," but a pervasive and self-reinforcing division of technological haves and have-nots (Burbules & Callister, 2000) . The vast majority of people in the world have no role in the networked systems that provide channels for communication, social interaction, political participation, and educational and employment opportunities, which many of the rest of us take for granted. Shut out of that space, the development of opportunities for that global majority will fall even further behind with time (hence, they have the qualities of a perennially caste-like group, not just a class on the wrong side of a digital divide that might be bridged). So as we celebrate the global information and communication networks that provide so many bene-fits and privileges for people around the world, we need reminders of those many more who are not present, whose silent absence is not voluntary-not a choice because even the possibility of a choice assumes conditions that do not and cannot exist for them (they are, in Freire's words, truly "oppressed").
The plurality of forms of dialogue, in principle, raises the question of whether the online space is equally hospitable to any of them or whether it tends tacitly to channel communicative engagements into some forms rather than others. Although I believe that the consequences of a "disembodied" presence in the online space have often been exaggerated (Burbules, 2002a )-and indeed are likely to become even less salient as video channels, tactile media, and virtual corporality become more and more the norm in online interactions-there is certainly a valid question of how this present feature of online interactions might drive communication into certain pathways. For example, are we more likely to debate contentiously or criticize when we cannot see our partners in online dialogue; are we more or less likely to disclose personal confidences when we feel safe behind a certain level of distance and anonymity; are we more or less likely to trust our partners in conversation (see Klecka, 2003) ? The space of online communication, like any other, is not neutral and shapes the form and content of what is said or written within it: Dynamic and flexible as these channels are, they have specific features-such as synchrony or asynchrony-which privilege certain voices, perspectives, and ways of communicating. Hence, once more, something like what Ellsworth (1997) calls "analytic dialogue" (which interrogates the very form and frame of communication and not simply its content or overt purpose and intent) is all the more relevant here.
Reflecting further on the nonneutrality of the online space, what I stressed earlier about the politics of dialogue recurs as a theme: As the Internet becomes more and more important as a kind of global public space, one in which political discourse, organizing, protest, and popular education already occur (to say nothing of eventual voting and formal participation), the ways in which people exploit this space-who and for what purposes-becomes itself a crucial leverage point of critique. In recalling Young's argument, where and how one adopts deliberative versus activist strategies is also a choice shaped by features of the space. How does one interrupt and demand attention from others when one's message can be blocked or erased with a single keystroke? Do hacking and Web site denial of service attacks take the role today of disruptive protests and sit ins? Do the privileged rhetorics of online chat rooms and other forums tend to reinforce the deliberative mode and discourage the activist? These are pressing issues for empirical study today.
What about the "desire for dialogue," as Jones calls it? How does the increasingly ubiquitous potential for online interactions (not just networked computers, but wireless connectivity, cell phones, handheld computers, text messaging, and on and on) alter the practices and dispositions of communication? Always accessible, never fully alone, the wired personality is both more connected to more disparate others and, for that very reason, all the more forced to make choices about availability, about prioritizing the importance and duration of replies, and about filtering incoming messages and information. Such connectivity requires those connected to create and protect separate, privileged spaces for those with whom interactions are most important and to establish barriers (e.g., spam filters) to exclude interactions with those who are not wanted. Does the growing desire for connectivity with others increase expectations about the kind, quantity, and quality of interactions? Does the ease now of one-to-many (and not merely one-to-one) communication-via Web pages, online forums, e-mail groups, blogs, and so on-create a growing desire for a certain publicity of identity, popularity, or influence? When everyone has a printing press (everyone who is online, at least), does that broaden or cheapen the impact of a public voice? Does it increase the sense of entitlement to attention from, and reactions from, others? These sort of potentialities, clearly, change the ways in which we think about dialogue, particularly in the complex dynamics and continuities between one-to-one and one-to-many, and between private and public, communication.
The discussion of Boler's affirmative action pedagogy refocuses attention on the questions of who is participating in a dialogue, and who is not, and why. In this context, issues of identity and group affiliation play a key role. But in online interactions, these issues of identity and group affiliation can be attenuated (though they are never entirely absent, even in ostensibly "anonymous" interactions; Burbules, 2002a) . What happens when you do not know the age, gender, race, and so forth of the person with whom you are interacting (they may tell you, of course, or post a photo, but that only moves the question back one level)? For advocates of a strong positional outlook (the people I call "Asa's," people who cannot speak without beginning their statements, "As a . . . "), these matters of identity are always present and always relevant, and so acknowledging them as such is not only a matter of simple honesty but a reassertion of a political axiom. At the other extreme are those who claim that only the content and truth value of a statement matters, not who utters it. If an argument is valid, the position or identity of the person who makes it are irrelevant. Online interactions, to the extent that they can support a certain degree of anonymity in communication, raise these questions anew: Do identity and positionality matter to evaluating the content of what people say online? Can you believe it when people report on who they are, or do you trust them less if they do not? Can you "tell who a person really is" simply by inference from the content of what they say ("No woman would ever say that or say that in such a way"), or does this simply introduce the possibility of a deeper level of potential deception, or, to put it in a more benign phrase, of constructed or virtual identity (see Turkle, 1995 , for many examples of both; see also Burbules, 2002a) ?
Such reflections on inclusion and exclusion, volubility and silence, lead back also to Huey-li Li's (2004) discussion of kinds of silences. There are many ways to communicate online, and many ways not to; but how does one read the absences and silences of online interactions? In a context where it is often impossible to know how to read the omission of information (did it exist in the first place, was it blocked or filtered, was it actively withheld, or was it merely I who was excluded from receiving it?), a set of questions that naturally arise in any sort of networked communication system (e.g., a web of gossip) are heightened by a medium in which an absence per se can never be understood as simply an absence. On the other side of this relation, there are the many ways in which a participant may choose to be silent, including, perhaps most significantly given the preceding discussion, the choice to remain outside the networked sphere entirely. When does a space so pervasively given over to the norms of chattiness, sharing information and points of view, and publicizing (i.e., making public) one's identity, voice, and experiences appear threatening to personality types or cultures premised more on the norms of quiet, solitude, and the internality of wisdom and insight? Viewed on a global scale, does the networked space have a kind of colonizing effect, spreading specific cultural norms of communication, including, not trivially, the accelerating spread of English as the privileged medium of expression?
Finally, and as a way of drawing these threads together, when and how does the networked space operate as a kind of third space for dialogue among disparate others on a global scale? How does the networked space attenuate the impact of physical distance as an impediment to interaction and mutual influence, or as a buffer preventing conflict? Elsewhere, I have written about the tropic effects of hyperlinks in Web pages (Burbules, 1997 (Burbules, , 2002b . These tropes can support the emergence of third spaces, because although connecting discrete discursive spaces (e.g., Web pages), they also invite a certain openended interpretation and reading of what that connection signifies; and like the Brown/Brown cross-readings of Gutierrez and her colleagues, previously, this potential invites various understandings, misunderstandings, and creative cross-understandings across those networked links. The very fact of anonymity in many online interactions, discussed above, may also open up surprising occasions for third spaces: for example, the experimental or exploratory advocacy of ideas or values not typical of my personality and affiliations-playing with ideas (and identities) in interactions with others that, because of some anonymity and distance, feel safe to me, and because of this opening up a possibility for entering a communicative space in which something truly surprising and new may emerge (although what is surprising and new can also be conflictual and unpleasant-I am not trying to be utopian about any of this: Third spaces can heighten conflict and not simply reconcile it).
And so, after a long journey through a web of interrelated ideas, we return again to a beginning: whether, and for whom, and in what forms, dialogue can support creative learning and exploration. My argument here suggests that today this question is shaped increasingly not only by the characteristics of verbal interaction with others-the face-to-face chats between Socrates and his students in the agora, or in Freire's classrooms for illiterate peasants, or in Ellsworth's C&I 607 course at the University of Wisconsin-but by the networked spaces through which many dialogues take place today. These present, I have tried to stress, both possibilities and dangers, and I hope to have illuminated a few of the ways in which critical theories of dialogue help us understand both the possibilities and the dangers of dialogue in these networked spaces. Note 1. I pose this concern in my introduction to Megan Boler's (2004, pp. xiii-xxxii) book Democratic Dialogue in Education: Troubling Speech, Disturbing Silence.
